positions, then a fresh attempt to interpret Religion, based on three novel interpretive assumptions-I begin by asking for clarification on how the authors understand their claims to IDKR's uniqueness. My second question, stemming from IDKR's Part 2, focuses on the legitimacy of one of its three interpretive innovations. I aim to offer the authors an opportunity to clarify where they stand on two issues that might otherwise prevent readers from accurately assessing the nature and extent of their accomplishment.
Kant's Religion as a Transcendental System
My first question is: What do you mean by your claim that IDKR uniquely presents "a holistic and linear interpretation" of Kant's Religion that portrays it as containing a "transcendental analysis" of religious concepts? 2 IDKR clearly does conduct such an analysis. What is puzzling is that the authors seem unaware that books in their own Bibliography have also done so. Given that Part 1 shows an impressive command of recent major trends in interpreting Religion, the authors must not intend the quoted words in their ordinary sense. Hermeneutic charity constrains one to assume they are aware that some of the very interpreters whose works they summarize have written section-by-section commentaries portraying Religion as defending a transcendental system. Unless the authors were either unaware of this or chose to ignore such previous attempts (neither assumption being charitable), they must have meant something idiosyncratic by "linear interpretation" and "transcendental analysis."
If the authors insist they are using these terms in their normal sense, my first question would be a request that the authors clarify why they failed to acknowledge that their approach in Part 2 follows an already established motif. Not in dispute is that IDKR uniquely responds to the challenges of certain specific allegations against the coherence of Kant's system. But Part 2 claims to accomplish far more than this, as if there simply are no precursors to their linear, transcendental analysis. Thus, this first challenge appears to be stronger: to explain how their understanding of a linear transcendental analysis differs fundamentally from past interpreters' understanding of these terms. Several examples that appear to contradict their claim will highlight the urgency of this challenge. Rather than acknowledging its relevance, IDKR misleadingly labels KCR as defending the "Religion-as-Symbol thesis" (209). One aspect of KCR's interpretation of Religion could be called a "Faith-as-Symbol thesis"; but this is very different. Religion, on my reading of Kant, puts believers in touch with an inner, transcendental reality that concrete symbols of faith must point to in order to retain meaningfulness; but religion cannot be reduced to these symbols! IDKR is completely correct to advance this claim (209), except insofar as to imply no previous interpreter has made it. Ironically, the authors note that Kant "admits" the importance symbols have in religion, portraying this as "akin to the Religion-as-Symbol motif of Ward and Palmquist" (229). Nowhere do I identify Kantian religion with symbolism; 10 yet IDKR latches onto one word, "symbolically" (177-178), to discount KCR's reading of Kantian atonement, even though KCR also defends a much deeper, non-symbolic interpretation, 11 similar to the one advanced in IDKR. KCR not only agrees with, but directly influenced IDKR's claim that Kant's first experiment in Religion is essentially a system of the transcendental conditions that make the symbols of empirical religion theoretically possible and morally necessary (e.g., KCR 148-149).
IDKR contrasts its heretofore allegedly "untried" approach to those of past interpreters with bold words like: "Gone was the temptation to truncate the text in order for it to make sense" (234). Yet some past interpreters have conducted the kind of holistic analysis IDKR claims to perform; not all "truncate the text." Ironically, the authors' implied self-assessment, that their interpretation does not truncate Kant's text, turns out to be questionable.
Locating Kant's Two "Experiments"
The novel assumption that most seriously undermines the overall cogency of IDKR's interpretation concerns how to identify Kant's two "experiments." The other two assumptionsthat Kant's distinction between pure cognition and empirical cognition helps overcome his strictures on God-talk, and that "disposition" for Kant refers to "the enduring moral ontology of IDKR points out that the Fourth Piece is divided into sections considering natural religion and revealed religion. The authors' discussion of these terms is accurate (219-220), though incomplete; it does not justify the conclusion drawn from it regarding the location of the second experiment. Because Kant associates both sections with Christianity, the authors assume both must refer to the second experiment. But the first section explicitly argues that Christianity at its core is a natural religion; as the authors admit, the latter is the topic of the The upshot is that, unless the authors can demonstrate the advantages of their problemdriven hermeneutic in general and of their assumption regarding the two experiments in particular, and can effectively rebut the weighty evidence that militates against the latter, IDKR presents the ironic picture of two "defenders" of Kant who, in trying to make his claims "coherent," end up portraying Religion in a manner that renders his position unworthy of
